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Abstract Scrip, or artificial currency, is a useful tool
for designing systems that are robust to selfish behavior
by users. However, it also introduces problems for a
system designer, such as how the amount of money in
the system should be set. In this paper, the effect of
varying the total amount of money in a scrip system on
efficiency (i.e., social welfare—the total utility of all the
agents in the system) is analyzed, and it is shown that
by maintaining the appropriate ratio between the total
amount of money and the number of agents, efficiency
is maximized. This ratio can be found by increasing the
money supply to just below the point that the system
would experience a “monetary crash,” where money is
sufficiently devalued that no agent is willing to perform
a service. The implications of the presence of altruists,
hoarders, sybils, and collusion on the performance of
Portion of the material in this paper appeared in preliminary
form in papers in the Proceedings of the 7th and 8th ACM
Conferences on Electronic Commerce Friedman et al (2006);
Kash et al (2007) and the Proceedings of the First Confer-
ence on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applica-
tions Kash et al (2009). Section 2 and Appendix A are repro-
duced from a companion paper Kash et al (2012) to make this
paper self-contained. Much of the work was performed while
Ian Kash and Eric Friedman were at Cornell University.
I. A. Kash
Microsoft Research Cambridge, 7 J. J. Thomson Ave, Cam-
bridge, UK CB3 0FB
E-mail: iankash@microsoft.com
E. J. Friedman
Internation Computer Science Institute and Department of
Computer Science, University of California, Soda Hall, Berke-
ley, CA 94720
E-mail: ejf@icsi.berkeley.edu
J. Y. Halpern
Computer Science Department, Cornell University, Upson
Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850
E-mail: halpern@cs.cornell.edu
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1 Introduction
Money is a powerful tool for dealing with selfish be-
havior. For example, in peer-to-peer systems, a com-
mon problem is free riding Adar and Huberman (2000),
where users take advantage of the resources offered by
a system without contributing their own. One way of
dealing with the problem is to have users pay for the use
of others’ resources, and to pay them for contributing
their own resources. The incentive to free ride then dis-
appears. Similarly, monetary incentives are a potential
solution to resource allocation problems in distributed
and peer-to-peer systems: this is the business model of
cloud computing services such as Amazon EC2.
In some systems, it may not be desirable to use ac-
tual money. As a result, many systems have used an
artificial currency, or scrip. (See Gupta et al (2003);
Ioannidis et al (2002); Miller and Drexler (1988); Reeves et al
(2007); Stonebraker et al (1996); Vishnumurthy et al (2003);
Brunelle et al (2006); Peterson and Sirer (2009); Aperjis et al
(2008) for some examples of the use of scrip in systems.)
While using scrip avoids some issues, such as process-
ing payments, it introduces new questions a system de-
signer must face. How much money should be printed?
What should happen if the system grows rapidly or
there is significant churn? What will happen if a small
number of users start hoarding money or creating sybils?
The story of the Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op
Sweeney and Sweeney (1977), popularized by Krugman
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1999, provides a cautionary tale of how system perfor-
mance can suffer if these issues are not handled ap-
propriately. The Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op was a
group of parents working on Capitol Hill who agreed to
cooperate to provide babysitting services to each other.
In order to enforce fairness, they issued a supply of
scrip with each coupon worth a half hour of babysitting.
At one point, the co-op had a recession. Many people
wanted to save up coupons for when they wanted to
spend an evening out. As a result, they went out less
and looked for more opportunities to babysit. Since a
couple could earn coupons only when another couple
went out, no one could accumulate more, and the prob-
lem only got worse.
After a number of failed attempts to solve the prob-
lem, such as mandating a certain frequency of going
out, the co-op started issuing more coupons. The re-
sults were striking. Since couples had a sufficient re-
serve of coupons, they were more comfortable spend-
ing them. This in turn made it much easier to earn
coupons when a couple’s supply got low. Unfortunately,
the amount of scrip grew to the point that most of the
couples felt “rich.” They had enough scrip for the fore-
seeable future, so naturally they didn’t want to devote
their evening to babysitting. As a result, couples who
wanted to go out were unable to find another couple
willing to babysit.
This anecdote shows that the amount of scrip in cir-
culation can have a significant impact on the effective-
ness of a scrip system. If there is too little money in the
system, few agents will be able to afford service. At the
other extreme, if there is too much money in the sys-
tem, people feel rich and stop looking for work. Both of
these extremes lead to inefficient outcomes. This sug-
gests that there is an optimal amount of money, and
that nontrivial deviations from the optimum towards
either extreme can lead to significant degradation in
the performance of the system.
In a companion paper Kash et al (2012), we gave a
formal model of a scrip system and studied the behavior
of scrip systems from a micro-economic, game-theoretic
viewpoint. Roughly speaking, in the model agents want
work done at random times. To get the work done, they
must have at least $1 of scrip.1 All the agents willing
to do the work volunteer to do it, and one is chosen at
random (although not necessarily uniformly at random;
agents may have different likelihoods of being chosen).
The agent who has the work done pays $1 to the agent
chosen to do it, and gains 1 unit of utility, while the
agent who does the work suffers a small utility loss. We
1 Although we refer to our unit of scrip as the dollar, these
are not real dollars, nor do we view “scrip dollars” as con-
vertible to real dollars.
showed that in such a scrip system, there is a nontrivial
Nash equilibrium where all agents use a threshold strat-
egy—that is, agent i volunteers to work iff i has below
some threshold of ki dollars (the threshold may be dif-
ferent for different agents). A key part of our analysis
involves a characterization of the distribution of wealth
when agents all use threshold strategies.
In this paper, we use the analysis of scrip systems
from Kash et al (2012) to understand how robust scrip
systems are, and how to optimize their performance.
We compute the money supply that maximizes social
welfare, given the number of agents. As we show, the
behavior mimics the behavior in the babysitting coop
example. Specifically, if we start with a system with
relatively little money (where “relatively little” is mea-
sured in terms of the average amount of money per
agent), adding more money decreases the number of
agents with no money, and thus increasing social wel-
fare. (Since it is more likely that an agent will be able
to pay for someone to work when he wants a job done.)
However, this only works up to a point. Once a critical
amount of money is reached, the system experiences a
monetary crash: just as in the babysitting coop exam-
ple, there is so much money that, in equilibrium, ev-
eryone will feel rich and no agents are willing to work.
We show that, to get optimal performance, we want the
total amount of money in the system to be as close as
possible to the critical amount, but not to go over it. If
the amount of money in the system is over the critical
amount, we get the worst possible equilibrium, where
no agent ever volunteers, and all agents have utility 0.
This means that, for a system designers’ point of view,
there is a significant tradeoff between efficiency and ro-
bustness.
The equilibrium analysis in Kash et al (2012) as-
sumes that all agents have somewhat similar motiva-
tion: in particular, they do not get pleasure simply from
performing a service, and are interested in money only
to the extent that they can use it to get services per-
formed. But in real systems, not all agents have this
motivation. Some of the more common “nonstandard”
agents are altruists and hoarders. Altruists are willing
to satisfy all requests, even if they go unpaid (think of
babysitters who love kids so much that they get plea-
sure from babysitting, and are willing to babysit for
free); hoarders value scrip for its own sake and are will-
ing to accumulate amounts far beyond what is actually
useful. Studies of the Gnutella peer-to-peer file-sharing
network have shown that one percent of agents sat-
isfy fifty percent of the requests Adar and Huberman
(2000); Hughes et al (2005). These agents are doing sig-
nificantly more work for others than they will ever have
done for them, so can be viewed as altruists. Anecdo-
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tal evidence also suggests that the introduction of any
sort of currency seems to inspire hoarding behavior on
the part of some agents, regardless of the benefit of
possessing money. For example, SETI@home has found
that contributors put in significant effort to make it to
the top of their contributor rankings. This has included
returning fake results of computations rather than per-
forming them Zhao et al (2005).
Altruists and hoarders have opposite effects on a
system: having altruists has the same effect as adding
money; having hoarders is essentially equivalent to re-
moving it. With enough altruists in the system, the
system has a monetary crash, in the sense that stan-
dard agents stop being willing to provide service, just
as when there is too much money in the system (the
system still functions on a limited basis after the mon-
etary crash because altruists still supply service). We
show that, until we get to the point where the sys-
tem crashes, the utility of standard agents is improved
by the presence of altruists. We show that the pres-
ence of altruists makes the critical point lower than it
would without them. Thus, a system designer trying
to optimize the performance of the system by making
the money supply as close as possible to the critical
point (but under it, since being over it would result
in a “crash”) needs to be careful about estimating the
number of altruists.
Similarly, we show that, as the fraction of hoarders
increases, standard agents begin to suffer because there
is effectively less money in circulation. On the other
hand, hoarders can improve the stability of a system.
Since hoarders are willing to accept an infinite amount
of money, they can prevent the monetary crash that
would otherwise occur as money was added. In any case,
our results show how the presence of both altruists and
hoarders can be mitigated by appropriately controlling
the money supply.
Beyond nonstandard agents, we also consider two
different manipulative behaviors in which standard agents
may engage: creating multiple identities, known as sybils
Douceur (2002), and collusion. In scrip systems where
each new user is given an initial amount of scrip, there
is an obvious benefit to creating sybils. Even if this
incentive is removed, sybils are still useful: they can
be used to increase the likelihood that an agent will
be asked to provide service, which makes it easier for
him to earn money. This increases the utility of the
sybilling agent, at the expense of other agents, in a
manner reminiscent of the large view attack on BitTor-
rent Sirivianos et al (2007). From the perspective of an
agent considering creating sybils, the first few sybils can
provide him with a significant benefit, but the benefits
of additional sybils rapidly diminish. So if a designer
can make sybilling moderately costly, the number of
sybils actually created by rational agents will usually
be relatively small.
If a small fraction of agents have sybils, the situa-
tion is more subtle. Agents with sybils still do better
than those without, but the situation is not zero-sum.
In particular, even agents without sybils might be bet-
ter off, due to having more opportunities to earn money.
Somewhat surprisingly, sybils can actually result in ev-
eryone being better off. However, exploiting this fact
is generally not desirable. The same process that leads
to an improvement in social welfare can also lead to a
monetary crash, where all agents stop providing service.
The system designer can achieve the same effects by in-
creasing the average amount of money or biasing the
volunteer selection process. In practice, it seems better
to do this than to exploit the possibility of sybils.
In our setting, having sybils is helpful because it
increases the likelihood that an agent will be asked to
provide service. Our analysis of sybils applies no mat-
ter how this increase in likelihood occurs. In particular,
it applies to advertising. Thus, our results suggest that
there are tradeoffs involved in allowing advertising. For
example, many systems allow agents to announce their
connection speed and other similar factors. If this biases
requests towards agents with high connection speeds,
even when agents with lower connection speeds are per-
fectly capable of satisfying a particular request, then
agents with low connection speeds will have an unnec-
essarily worsened experience in the system. This also
means that such agents will have a strong incentive to
lie about their connection speed.
While collusion is considered a bad thing in most
systems, in the context of scrip systems with fixed prices,
it is almost entirely positive. Without collusion, if a user
runs out of money he is unable to request service until
he is able to earn some. However, a colluding group can
pool there money so that all members can make a re-
quest whenever the group as a whole has some money.
This increases welfare for the agents who collude be-
cause agents who have no money receive no service.
Collusion tends to benefit the non-colluding agents as
well. Since colluding agents work less often, it is eas-
ier for everyone to earn money, which ends up making
everyone better off. However, as with sybils, collusion
does have the potential of crashing the system if the
average amount of money is too close to the critical
point.
While a designer should generally encourage collu-
sion in scrip systems, we would expect that in most sys-
tems there will be relatively little collusion, and what
collusion exists will involve small numbers of agents. Af-
ter all, scrip systems exist to try and resolve resource-
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allocation problems. If agents could collude to opti-
mally allocate resources within the group, they would
not need a scrip system in the first place. Nevertheless,
our analysis of collusion indicates a way that system
performance could be improved even without collusion.
Many of the benefits of collusion come from agents ef-
fectively being allowed to have a negative amount of
money (by borrowing from their the other agents with
whom they are colluding). These benefits could also
be realized if agents are allowed to borrow money, so
designing a loan mechanism could be an important im-
provement for a scrip system. Of course, implementing
such a loan mechanism in a way that prevents abuse
requires a careful design.
The analysis we carry out here has a benefit beyond
showing how to deal with altruists, hoarders, sybils, and
collusion. In order to utilize our results effectively, a sys-
tem designer needs to be able to identify characteristics
of agents (with what frequency do they make requests,
how likely are they to be chosen to satisfy a request, and
so on) and what strategies they are following. This is
particularly useful because finding an amount of money
close to the point of monetary crash, but not past it,
relies on an understanding of the agents in the system.
Of course, such information is also of great interest to
social scientists and marketers. We show how relatively
simple observations of the system can be used to infer
this information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we repeat the formal model from Kash et al
(2012). Then in Section 3, we summarize the results
from that paper. We begin applying these results in
Section 4, where we show that the analysis leads to an
understanding of how to choose the amount of money
in the system (or, equivalently, the cost to fulfill a re-
quest) so as to maximize efficiency, and also shows how
to handle new users. In Section 5, we discuss how the
model can be used to understand the effects of altru-
ists, hoarders, sybils, and collusion and provide guid-
ance about how system designers can handle these user
behaviors. All of this guidance relies on being able to
understand what strategies agents are using and what
their preferences are. In Section 6, we discuss how these
can be inferred by examining the system. We conclude
in Section 7.
2 The Model
For the convenience of the reader we repeat Section 3 of
our companion paper which describes the model Kash et al
(2012).
Before specifying our model formally, we give an in-
tuitive description of what our model captures. While
our model simplifies a number of features (as does any
model), we believe that it provides useful insights. We
model a scrip system where, as in a P2P filesharing sys-
tem, agents provide each other with service. There is a
single service (such as file uploading) that agents occa-
sionally want. In practice, at any given time, a number
of agents will want service but, to simplify the formal
description and analysis, we model the scrip system as
proceeding in a series of rounds where, in each round,
a single agent wants service (the time between rounds
will be adjusted to capture the growth in parallelism
as the number of agents grows).2 In each round, af-
ter an agent requests service, other agents have to de-
cide whether they want to volunteer to provide service.
However, not all agents may be able to satisfy the re-
quest (not everyone has every file). While, in practice,
the ability of agents to provide service at various times
may be correlated for a number of reasons (if I don’t
have the file today I probably still don’t have it to-
morrow; if one agent does not have a file, it may be
because it is rare, so that should increase the probabil-
ity that other agents do not have it), for simplicity, we
assume that the events of an agent being able to pro-
vide service in different rounds or two agents being able
to provide service in the same or different rounds are
independent. While our analysis relies on this assump-
tion so that we can describe the system using a Markov
chain, we expect that our results would still hold as
long these correlations are sufficiently small. If there is
at least one volunteer, someone is chosen from among
the volunteers (at random) to satisfy the request. Our
model allows some agents to be more likely to be chosen
(perhaps they have more bandwidth) but does not al-
low an agent to specify which agent is chosen. Allowing
agents this type of control would break the symmetries
we use to characterize the long run behavior of the sys-
tem and create new opportunities for strategic behav-
ior by agents that are beyond the scope of this paper.
The requester then gains some utility (he got the file)
and the volunteer loses some utility (he had to use his
bandwidth to upload the file), and the requester pays
the volunteer a fee that we fix at one dollar. As is stan-
dard in the literature, we assume that agents discount
future payoffs. This captures the intuition that a util
now is worth more than a util tomorrow, and allows us
to compute the total utility derived by an agent in an
infinite game. The amount of utility gained by having
a service performed and the amount lost be performing
2 For large numbers of agents, our model converges to one
in which agents make requests in real time, and the time
between an agent’s requests is exponentially distributed. In
addition, the time between requests served by a single player
is also exponentially distributed.
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it, as well as many other parameters may depend on
the agent.
More formally, we assume that agents have a type
t drawn from some finite set T of types. We can de-
scribe the entire population of agents using the pair
(T, f), where f is a vector of length |T | and ft is the
fraction with type t. For most of the paper, we consider
only what we call standard agents. These are agents
who derive no pleasure from performing a service, and
for whom money has no intrinsic value. Thus, for a
standard agent, there is no direct connection between
money (measured in dollars) and utility (measured in
utils). We can characterize the type of a standard agent
by a tuple t = (αt, βt, γt, δt, ρt, χt), where
– αt > 0 reflects the cost for an agent of type t to
satisfy a request;
– 0 < βt < 1 is the probability that an agent of type
t can satisfy a request;
– γt > αt is the utility that an agent of type t gains
for having a request satisfied;
– 0 < δt < 1 is the rate at which an agent of type t
discounts utility;
– ρt > 0 represents the (relative) request rate (some
people want files more often than others). For ex-
ample, if there are two types of agents with ρt1 = 2
and ρt2 = 1 then agents of the first type will make
requests twice as often as agents of the second type.
Since these request rates are relative, we can mul-
tiply them all by a constant to normalize them. To
simplify later notation, we assume the ρt are nor-
malized so that
∑
t∈T ρtft = 1; and
– χt > 0 represents the (relative) likelihood of an
agent to be chosen when he volunteers (some up-
loaders may be more popular than others). In par-
ticular, this means the relative probability of two
given agents being chosen is independent of which
other agents volunteer.
– ωt = βtχt/ρt is not part of the tuple, but is an
important derived parameter that helps determine
how much money an agent will have.
We occasionally omit the subscript t on some of these
parameters when it is clear from context or irrelevant.
Representing the population of agents in a system
as (T, f) captures the essential features of a scrip sys-
tem we want to model: there are a large number of
agents who may have different types. Note that fixing
a particular tuple (T, f) puts a constraint on the num-
ber N of agents. For example, if there are two types,
and f says that half of the agents are of each type, then
there cannot be 101 agents. Similar issues arise when we
want to talk about the amount of money in a system.
We could deal with this problem in a number of ways
(for example, by having each agent determine his type
at random according to the distribution f). For conve-
nience, we simply do not consider population sizes that
are incompatible with f . This is the approach used in
the literature on N -replica economies Mas-Colell et al
(1995).
Formally, we consider games specified by a tuple
(T, f , h,m, n), where T and f are as defined above, h ∈
N is the base number of agents of each type, n ∈ N is
number of replicas of these agents and m ∈ R+ is the
average amount of money. The total number of agents
is thus hn. We ensure that the fraction of agents of
type t is exactly ft and that the average amount of
money is exactlym by requiring that fth ∈ N andmh ∈
N. Having created a base population satisfying these
constraints, we can make an arbitrary number of copies
of it. More precisely, we assume that agents 0 . . . ft1h−1
have type t1, agents ft1h . . . (ft1 + ft2)h − 1 have type
t2, and so on through agent h − 1. These base agents
determine the types of all other agents. Each agent j ∈
{h, . . . , hn− 1} has the same type as j mod h; that is,
all the agents of the form j + kh for k = 1, . . . , n − 1
are replicas of agent j.
We also need to specify how money is initially allo-
cated to agents. Our results are based on the long-run
behavior of the system and so they turn out to hold for
any initial allocation of money. For simplicity, at the
start of the game we allocate each of the hmn dollars
in the system to an agent chosen uniformly at random,
but all our results would hold if we chose any other
initial distribution of money.
To make precise our earlier informal description,
we describe (T, f , h,m, n) as an infinite extensive-form
game. A non-root node in the game tree is associated
with a round number (how many requests have been
made so far), a phase number, either 1, 2, 3 , or 4
(which describes how far along we are in determining
the results of the current request), a vector x where
xi is the current amount of money agent i has, and∑
i xi = mhn, and, for some nodes, some additional in-
formation whose role will be made clear below. We use
τ(i) to denote the type of agent i.
– The game starts at a special root node, denoted Λ,
where nature moves. Intuitively, at Λ, nature allo-
cates money uniformly at random, so it transitions
to a node of the form (0, 1,x): round zero, phase
one, and allocation of money x, and each possible
transition is equally likely.
– At a node of the form (r, 1,x), nature selects an
agent to make a request in the current round. Agent
i is chosen with probability ρτ(i)/hn. (Note that this
is a probability because
∑
i ρτ(i) =
∑
t fthnρt =
hn.) If i is chosen, a transition is made to (r, 2,x, i).
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– At a node of the form (r, 2,x, i), nature selects the
set V of agents (not including i) able to satisfy the
request. Each agent j 6= i is included in V with
probability βτ(j). If V is chosen, a transition is made
to (r, 3,x, i, V ).
– At a node of the form (r, 3,x, i, V ), each agent in
V chooses whether to volunteer. If V ′ is the set of
agents who choose to volunteer, a transition is made
to (r, 4,x, i, V ′).
– At a node of the form (r, 4,x, i, V ′), if V ′ 6= ∅,
nature chooses a single agent in V ′ to satisfy the
request. Each agent j is chosen with probability
χτ(j)/
∑
j′∈V ′ χτ(j′). If j is chosen, a transition is
made to (r + 1, 1,x′), where
x′ℓ =


xℓ − 1 if ℓ = i and xi > 0,
xℓ + 1 if ℓ is chosen by nature and xi > 0,
xℓ otherwise.
If V ′ = ∅ or xi = 0, nature has no choice; a transi-
tion is made to (r + 1, 1,x) with probability 1.
A strategy for agent j describes whether or not he
will volunteer at every node of the form (r, 3,x, i, V )
such that j ∈ V . (These are the only nodes where j
can move.) We also need to specify what agents know
when they make their decisions. To make our results
as strong as possible, we allow an agent to base his
strategy on the entire history of the game, which in-
cludes, for example, the current wealth of every other
agent. As we show, even with this unrealistic amount of
information, available, it would still be approximately
optimal to adopt a simple strategy that requires lit-
tle information—specifically, agents need to know only
their current wealth. That means that our results would
continue to hold as long as agents knew at least this in-
formation. A strategy profile S consists of one strategy
per agent. A strategy profile S determines a probabil-
ity distribution over paths PrS in the game tree. Each
path determines the value of the following random two
variables:
– xri , the amount of money agent i has during round
r, defined as the value of xi at the nodes with round
number r and
– uri , the utility of agent i for round r. If i is a standard
agent, then
uri =


γτ(i) if the path has a node (r, 4,x, i, V
′ 6= 0)
−ατ(i) if i is chosen at node (r, 4,x, j, V
′)
0 otherwise.
Ui(S), the total expected utility of agent i if strat-
egy profile S is played, is the discounted sum of his per
round utilities uri , but the exact form of the discount-
ing requires some explanation. In our model, only one
agent makes a request each round. As the number of
agents increases, an agent has to wait a larger number
of rounds to make requests, so naively discounting util-
ity would mean his utility decreases as the number of
agents increases, even if all of his requests are satisfied.
This is an artifact our model breaking time into discrete
rounds where a single agent makes a request. In reality,
many agents make requests in parallel, and how often
an agent desires service typically does not depend on
the number of agents. It would be counterintuitive to
have a model that says that if agents make requests at a
fixed rate and they are all satisfied, then their expected
utility depends on the number of other agents. As the
following lemma shows, there is a unique discount rate
that removes this dependency.3
Lemma 1 With a discount rate of (1− (1− δt)/n), an
agent of type t’s expected discounted utility for having
all his requests satisfied is independent of the number
of replicas n. Furthermore, this is the unique such rate
such that the discount rate is δt when n = 1.
Proof The agent makes a request each round with prob-
ability ρt/hn, so his expected discounted utility for hav-
ing all his requests satisfied is
∞∑
r=0
(1 − (1− δt)/n)
r(ρtγt/(hn))
= (ρtγt/(hn))/(1− (1− (1− δt)/n))
= (ρtγt/h)/(1− δt)
This is independent of n and satisfies (1− (1− δt)/1) =
δt as desired. The choice of discount rate for the n = 1
case is unique by the requirement that it be δt. For n >
1, the choice is unique because otherwise the agent’s
expected discounted utility would not be (ρtγt/h)/(1−
δt) and thus would not be independent of n.
As is standard in economics, for example in the
folk theorem for repeated games Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), we multiply an agent’s utility by (1−δt) so that
his expected utility is independent of his discount rate
as well. With these considerations in mind, the total
expected utility of agent i given the vector of strategies
S is
Ui(S) = (1− δτ(i))
∞∑
r=0
(1 − (1− δτ(i))/n)
rES[u
r
i ]. (1)
3 In preliminary versions of this work we used the discount
rate of δ1/nt . This rate captures the intuitive idea of mak-
ing the time between rounds 1/n, but results in an agent’s
utility depending on the number of other agents, even if all
the agent’s requests are satisfied. However, in the limit as δt
goes to 1, agents’ normalized expected utilities (multiplied by
1− δt as in Equation 1) are the same either discount rate, so
our main results hold with the discount rate δ1/nt as well.
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In modeling the game this way, we have implicitly
made a number of assumptions. For example, we have
assumed that all of agent i’s requests that are satisfied
give agent i the same utility, and that prices are fixed.
We discuss the implications of these assumptions in our
companion paper Kash et al (2012).
Our solution concept is the standard notion of an
approximate Nash equilibrium. As usual, given a strat-
egy profile S and agent i, we use (S′i,S−i) to denote the
strategy profile that is identical to S except that agent
i uses S′i.
Definition 1 A strategy S′i for agent i is an ǫ-best reply
to a strategy profile S−i for the agents other than i in
the game (T, f , h,m, n) if, for all strategies S′′i ,
Ui(S
′′
i ,S−i) ≤ Ui(S
′
i,S−i) + ǫ.
Definition 2 A strategy profile S for the game
(T, f , h,m, n) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if for all agents
i, Si is an ǫ-best reply to S−i. A Nash equilibrium is an
epsilon-Nash equilibrium with ǫ = 0.
As we show in our companion paper Kash et al (2012),
(T, f , h,m, n) has equilibria where agents use a partic-
ularly simple type of strategy, called a threshold strat-
egy. Intuitively, an agent with “too little” money will
want to work, to minimize the likelihood of running out
due to making a long sequence of requests before being
able to earn more money. On the other hand, a ratio-
nal agent with plenty of money will think it is better to
delay working, thanks to discounting. These intuitions
suggest that the agent should volunteer if and only if
he has less than a certain amount of money. Let sk be
the strategy where an agent volunteers if and only if
the requester has at least 1 dollar and the agent has
less than k dollars. Note that s0 is the strategy where
the agent never volunteers. While everyone playing s0
is a Nash equilibrium (nobody can do better by volun-
teering if no one else is willing to), it is an uninteresting
one.
We frequently consider the situation where each agent
of type t uses the same threshold skt . In this case, a
single vector k suffices to indicate the threshold of each
type, and we can associate with this vector the strategy
S(k) where S(k)i = skτ(i) (i.e., agent i of type τ(i) uses
threshold kτ(i)).
For the rest of this paper, we focus on threshold
strategies (and show why it is reasonable to do so). In
particular, we show that, if all other agents use thresh-
old strategies, it is approximately optimal for an agent
to use one as well. Furthermore there exist Nash equi-
libria where agents do so. While there are potentially
other equilibria that use different strategies, if a system
designer has agents use threshold strategies by default,
no agent will have an incentive to change. Since thresh-
old strategies have such low information requirements,
they are a particularly attractive choice for a system
designer as well for the agents, since they are so easy
to play.
When we consider the threshold strategy S(k), for
ease of exposition, we assume in our analysis thatmhn <∑
t ftkthn. To understand why, note thatmhn is the to-
tal amount of money in the system. Ifmhn ≥
∑
t ftkthn,
then if the agents use a threshold S(k), the system will
quickly reach a state where each agent has kt dollars, so
no agent will volunteer. This is equivalent to all agents
using a threshold of 0, and similarly uninteresting.
3 Summary of Previous Results
In this section, we summarize the results and defini-
tions from our companion paper Kash et al (2012) that
we use in this paper. We also provide intuition for the
results, some of which is taken from that paper. The
first theorem shows that there exists a particular dis-
tribution of wealth such that, after a sufficient amount
of time, the distribution of wealth in the system will
almost always be close to that particular distribution.
In order to formalize this statement, we need a number
of definitions.
Let
XT,f ,h,m,n,k = {x ∈ N
hn | ∀i.xi ≤ kτ(i),
∑
i
xi = hmn}
be the set of allocations of money to agents such that
the average amount of money is m and no agent i has
more than kτ(i) dollars. The evolution of x
r can be de-
scribed by a Markov chain MT,f ,h,m,n,k over the state
space XT,f ,h,m,n,k. For brevity, we refer to the Markov
chain and state space as M and X , respectively, when
the subscripts are clear from context. Let ∆f ,m,k de-
note the set of probability distributions d on ∪t∈T {t}×∏
t{0, . . . , kt} such that for all types t,
∑kt
l=0 d(t, l) = ft
and
∑
t∈T
∑kt
l=0 ld(t, l) = m. We can think of d(t, l) as
the fraction of agents that are of type t and have l dol-
lars. We can associate each state x with its correspond-
ing distribution dx ∈ ∆f ,m,k. Occasionally, we will make
use of distributions d on ∪t∈T {t} ×
∏
t{0, . . . , kt} such
that for all types t,
∑kt
l=0 d(t, l) = ft, without requir-
ing that
∑
t∈T
∑kt
l=0 ld(t, l) = m; we denote this set of
distributions ∆f ,k. Given two distributions d, q ∈ ∆f ,k,
let
H(d||q) = −
∑
{(t,j):q(t,j) 6=0}
d(t, j) log d(t, j)/q(t, j)
denote the relative entropy of d relative to q (H(d||q) =
∞ if d(t, j) = 0 and q(t, j) 6= 0 or vice versa); this is
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also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence of q from
d Cover and Thomas (1991). For q in∆f ,k, we make use
of d∗q , the distribution in ∆f ,m,k that minimizes relative
entropy relative to q. If q happens to be in ∆f ,m,k and
not just ∆f ,k this is trivially q, but it is well defined in
general. Given ε > 0 and q, let XT,f ,h,m,n,k,ε,q (or Xε,q,
for brevity) denote the set of states x ∈ XT,f ,h,m,n,k
such that
∑
(t,j) |d
x(t, j) − d∗q |
2 < ε. Let Irq,n,ε be the
random variable that is 1 if dx
r
∈ Xε,q, and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 1 For all games (T, f , h,m, 1), all vectors k
of thresholds, and all ε > 0, there exist q ∈ ∆f ,k and nε
such that, for all n > nε, there exists a round r
∗ such
that, for all r > r∗, we have Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1− ε.
Theorem 1 tells us that, after enough time, the dis-
tribution of money is almost always close to some d∗,
where d∗ can be characterized as a distribution that
minimizes relative entropy subject to some constraints.
For many of our results, a more explicit characteriza-
tion will be helpful. Let q(t, i) = (ωt)
i/(
∑
t
∑kt
j=0(ωt)
j).
Then the value of d∗ is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2
d∗(t, i) =
ftλ
iq(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
jq(t, j)
, (2)
where λ is the unique value such that
∑
t
∑
i
id∗(t, i) = m. (3)
We now turn from an analysis of the distribution
of wealth to an analysis of best replies and equilibria.
To see that threshold strategies are approximately opti-
mal, consider a single agent i of type t and fix the vector
k of thresholds used by the other agents. If we assume
that the number of agents is large, what an agent i does
has essentially no affect on the behavior of the system
(although it will, of course, affect that agent’s payoffs).
In particular, this means that the distribution q of The-
orem 1 characterizes the distribution of money in the
system. This distribution, together with the vector k of
thresholds, determines what fraction of agents volun-
teers at each step. This, in turn, means that from the
perspective of agent i, the problem of finding an optimal
response to the strategies of the other agents reduces to
finding an optimal policy in a Markov decision process
(MDP) PG,S(k),t. The behavior of the MDP PG,S(k),t
depends on two probabilities: pu and pd. Informally, pu
is the probability of i earning a dollar during each round
it is willing to volunteer, and pd is the probability that
i will be chosen to make a request during each round.
Note that pu and pd depend on aspects of m, k, and t;
if the dependence is important, we add the relevant pa-
rameters to the superscript, writing, for example, pm,ku .
This MDP is described formally in Appendix A.
For many of our later results and discussion, it will
be important to understand how pu, pd, and t affect
the optimal policy for PG,S(k),t, and thus the ε-optimal
strategies in the game. We use this understanding to
show that adding money increases social welfare in Sec-
tion 4, to understand how agent behaviors affect social
welfare in Section 5, and to identify agent types from
their behavior in Section 6. The effects of these param-
eters are captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Consider the games Gn = (T, f , h,m, n) (where
T , f , h, and m are fixed, but n may vary), and fix the
vector k of thresholds of the other agents. There ex-
ists a k such that for all n, sk is an optimal policy for
PGn,S(k),t. The threshold k is the maximum value of κ
such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1− δt)/n)
J(κ,pu,pd)]γt, (4)
where J(κ, pu, pd) is a random variable whose value
is the first round in which an agent starting with κ dol-
lars, using strategy sκ, and with probabilities pu and pd
of earning a dollar and of being chosen given that he
volunteers, respectively, runs out of money.
While threshold strategies are optimal for the MDP,
given a fixed pu and pd, the probabilities pu and pd rep-
resent the typical long-run probabilities, not the exact
values in each round of the game. Nevertheless, as the
following theorem shows, threshold strategies are near
optimal in the actual game, not just in the MDP.
Theorem 2 For all games G = (T, f , h,m, n), all vec-
tors k of thresholds, and all ε > 0, there exist n∗ε and
δ∗ε,n such that for all n > n
∗
ε, types t ∈ T , and δt > δ
∗
ε,n,
an optimal threshold policy for PG,S(k),t is an ε-best re-
ply to the strategy profile S(k)−i for every agent i of
type t.
Given a game G = (T, f , h,m, n) and a vector k of
thresholds, Lemma 3 gives an optimal threshold k′t for
each type t. Theorem 2 guarantees that sk′t is an ε-best
reply to S−i(k), but does not rule out the possibility of
other best replies. However, for ease of exposition, we
will call k′t the best reply to S−i and call BRG(k) =
k′ the best-reply function. The following lemma shows
that this function is monotone (non-decreasing). Along
the way, several other quantities are shown to be mono-
tone.
Lemma 4 Consider the family of games
Gm = (T, f , h,m, n) and the strategies S(k), for mhn <
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∑
t ftkthn. For this family of game, λm,k is non-decreasing
in m and non-increasing in k; pm,ku is non-decreasing
in m and non-increasing in k; and the function BRG
is non-decreasing in k and non-increasing in m.
Our final theorem show that there exists a non-
trivial equilibrium where all agents play threshold strate-
gies greater than zero. In the theorem, we refer to the
“greatest” vector. By this we mean that there exists a
vector that is an equilibrium and, in a component-wise
comparison, is greater than all other such equilibrium
strategy vectors. We refer to this particular equilibrium
as the greatest equilibrium.
Theorem 3 For all games G = (T, f , h,m, 1) and all
ǫ, there exist n∗ǫ and δ
∗
ǫ,n such that, if n > n
∗
ǫ and δt >
δ∗ǫ,n for all t, then there exists a nontrivial vector k
of thresholds that is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
there exists a greatest such vector.
The proof of Theorem 3 also provides an algorithm
for finding equilibria that seems efficient in practice:
start with the strategy profile (∞, . . . ,∞) and iterate
the best-reply dynamics until an equilibrium is reached.
While multiple nontrivial equilibria may exist, in
the rest of this paper, we focus on the greatest equi-
librium in all our applications (although a number of
our results hold for all nontrivial equilibria). This equi-
librium has several desirable properties, discussed in
Section 5 of our companion paper Kash et al (2012).
4 Social Welfare and Scalability
In this section, we consider a fundamental question
faced by system designers: what is the optimal amount
of money and how does it depend on the size of the
system? We discuss how our theoretical results summa-
rized in Section 3 show that in order to maximize social
welfare, the optimal amount of money is some constant
per agent. Thus, a system designer that wants to maxi-
mize social welfare should manage the average quantity
of money appropriately. However, we also show that
this must be done carefully. Specifically, we show that
increasing the amount of money improves performance
up to a certain point, after which the system experi-
ences a monetary crash. Once the system crashes, the
only equilibrium will be the trivial one where all agents
play s0. Thus, optimizing the performance of the sys-
tem involves discovering how much money the system
can handle before it crashes.
In Section 2, we define the game using a tuple G =
(T, f , h,m, n). Thus, our definition of a game uses the
average amount of money m rather than the equally
reasonable total amount of money mhn. The choice is
motivated by our theoretical results. Theorem 1 shows
that the long-term distribution of money d∗ depends
on the average amount of money, but is independent
of n, provided that n is sufficiently large. Thus, since
we normalize δt by the number of agents in computing
utility, the optimal threshold policy for the MDP de-
veloped in Appendix A is also independent of n. The-
orems 2 and 3 show that such policies constitute an
ε-Nash equilibrium. Thus, modulo a technical issue re-
garding the rate of convergence of the Markov Chain
towards its stationary distribution, to determine the
optimal amount of money for a large system, it suf-
fices to determine the optimal value of m, the average
amount of money per agent.
We remark that, in practice, it may be easier for the
designer to vary the price of fulfilling a request than to
control the amount of money in the system. This pro-
duces the same effect. For example, changing the cost
of fulfilling a request from $1 to $2 is equivalent to halv-
ing the amount of money that each agent has. Similarly,
halving the the cost of fulfilling a request is equivalent
to doubling the amount of money that everyone has.
With a fixed amount hmn of money, there is an opti-
mal product hnc of the number hn of agents and the
cost c of fulfilling a request.
This also tells us how to deal with a dynamic pool
of agents. Our system can handle newcomers relatively
easily: simply allow them to join with no money. This
gives existing agents no incentive to leave and rejoin as
newcomers. (By way of contrast, in systems where each
new agent starts off with a small amount of money, such
an incentive clearly exists.) We then change the price
of fulfilling a request so that the optimal ratio is main-
tained. This method has the nice feature that it can
be implemented in a distributed fashion; if all nodes
in the system have a good estimate of n, then they can
all adjust prices automatically. (Alternatively, the num-
ber of agents in the system can be posted in a public
place.) Approaches that rely on adjusting the amount
of money may require expensive system-wide computa-
tions (see Vishnumurthy et al (2003) for an example),
and must be carefully tuned to avoid creating incen-
tives for agents to manipulate the system by which this
is done.
Note that, in principle, the realization that the cost
of fulfilling a request can change can affect an agent’s
strategy. For example, if an agent expects the cost to
increase, then he may want to defer volunteering to
fulfill a request. However, if the number of agents in
the system is always increasing, then the cost always
decreases, so there is never any advantage in waiting.
There may be an advantage in delaying a request, but
it is far more costly, in terms of waiting costs than in
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providing service, since we assume the need for a ser-
vice is often subject to real waiting costs. In particular,
many service requests, such as those for information or
computation, cannot be delayed without losing most of
their value.
Issues of implementation aside, we have now re-
duced the problem of determining the optimal total
amount of money for a large system to that of determin-
ing the optimal average amount of money, independent
of the exact number of agents. Before we can determine
the optimal value of m, we have to answer a more fun-
damental question: given an equilibrium that arose for
some value of m, how good is it?
Consider a single round of the game with a popula-
tion of a single type t and an equilibrium threshold k. If
a request is satisfied, social welfare increases by γt−αt;
the requester gains γt utility and the satisfier pays a
cost of αt. If no request is satisfied then no utility is
gained. What is the probability that a request will be
satisfied? This requires two events to occur. First, the
agent chosen to make a request must have a dollar,
which happens with probability approximately 1 − ζ,
where ζ = d∗(t, 0) is the fraction of agents with no
money. Second, there must be a volunteer able and will-
ing to satisfy the request. Any agent who does not have
his threshold amount of money is willing to volunteer.
Thus, if θ = d∗(t, kt) is the fraction of agents at their
threshold, then the probability of having a volunteer is
1−(1−βt)(1−θ)n. We believe that in most large systems
this probability is quite close to 1; otherwise, either βt
must be unrealistically small or θ must be very close to
1. For example, even if β = .01 (i.e., an agent can satisfy
1% of requests), (1− θ)n = 1000 agents will be able to
satisfy 99.99% of requests. If θ is close to 1, then agents
will have an easier time earning money then spending
money (the probability of spending a dollar is at most
1/n, while for large β the probability of earning a dollar
if an agent volunteers is roughly (1/n)(1/(1 − θ))). If
an agent is playing s4 and there are n rounds played
a day, this means that for θ = .9 he would be willing
to pay αt today to receive γt over 10 years from now.
For most systems, it seems unreasonable to have δt or
γt/αt this large. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis,
we approximate 1− (1− βt)(1−θ)n by 1.
With this approximation, we can write the expected
increase in social welfare each round as (1−ζ)(γt−αt).
If we have more than one type of agent, the situation
is essentially the same. The equation for social welfare
is more complicated because now the gain in welfare
depends on the γ, α, and δ of the agents chosen in that
round, but the overall analysis is the same, albeit with
more cases. In the general case,
ζ =
∑
t
d∗(t, 0) (5)
Thus our goal is clear: find the amount of money that,
in equilibrium, minimizes ζ.
In general, as the following theorem shows, ζ de-
creases as m increases. More specifically, given our as-
sumption that the system is starting at the greatest
equilibrium k, increasing m and then following best re-
sponse dynamics leads to the new greatest equilibrium
k′. As long as k′ is non-trivial, ζm′,k′ ≤ ζm,k.
Theorems 1, 2, and 3 place requirements on the val-
ues of n and δt. Intuitively, the theorems require that
the δts is sufficiently large to ensure that agents are
patient enough that their decisions are dominated by
long-run behavior rather than short-term utility, and
that n is sufficiently large to ensure that small changes
in the distribution of money do not move it far from
d∗. In the theorems in this section, assume that these
conditions are satisfied. To simplify the statements of
the theorems, we use “the standard conditions hold” to
mean that the game G = (T, f , h,m, n) under consider-
ation is such that n > n∗ and δt > δ
∗ for the n∗ and δ∗
needed for the results of Theorems 1, 2, and 3 to apply.
Theorem 4 Let G = (T, f , h,m, n) be such that the
standard conditions hold, and let k be the greatest equi-
librium for G. Then if m′ > m, the best-reply dynamics
in G′ = (T, f , h,m′, n) starting at k converge to some
k′ ≤ k that is the greatest equilibrium of G′. If k′ is a
nontrivial equilibrium, then ζm′,k′ ≤ ζm,k.
Proof In the proof of Theorem 3, it is shown that start-
ing at any vector k0 greater than the greatest equi-
librium and applying best-reply dynamics (iteratively
replacing ki with the vector of best-reply strategies
ki+1 = BRG(ki)) leads to the greatest equilibrium
in a finite number of steps. Since k is an equilibrium,
BRG(k) = k. By Lemma 4, BRG is non-increasing in
m. Thus, k = BRG(k) ≥ BRG′(k). Applying best-reply
dynamics using BRG′ starting at k gives us an equilib-
rium k′ such that k′ ≤ k. By Lemma 4, BRG(k′′) is
non-decreasing in k′′, so this is the greatest equilibrium.
Suppose that k′ is nontrivial. By Equations (2) and (5),
ζm,k =
∑
t
d∗(t, 0) =
∑
t
ftλ
i
m,kq(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
j
m,kq(t, j)
.
Again by Lemma 4, λm,k is non-decreasing in m and
non-increasing in k. Thus, ζm′,k′ ≤ ζm,k.
Theorem 4 tells us that, as long as the system does
not crash, more money is better. The following corollary
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tells us that such a crash is an essential feature; a suffi-
cient increase in the amount of money leads to a mon-
etary crash. Moreover, once the system has crashed,
adding more money does not cause the system to be-
come “uncrashed.”
Corollary 1 Consider the family of games
Gm = (T, f , h,m, n) such that the standard conditions
hold. There exists a critical average amountm∗ of money
such that if m < m∗, then Gm has a nontrivial equi-
librium, while if m > m∗, then Gm has no nontrivial
equilibria in threshold strategies. (A nontrivial equilib-
rium may or may not exist if m = m∗.)
Proof To see that there is some m for which Gm has
no nontrivial equilibrium, fix m. If there is no nontriv-
ial equilibrium in Gm, we are done. Otherwise, suppose
that the greatest equilibrium in Gm is k. Choose m
′ >∑
t ftkt, and let k
′ be the greatest equilibrium in Gm′ .
By Theorem 4, k′ ≤ k. But if k′ is a nontrivial equilib-
rium then, in equilibrium, each agent of type t has at
most k′t ≤ kt dollars. But then m
′ >
∑
t ftkt ≥
∑
ftk
′
t,
a contradiction.
Let m∗ be the infimum over all m for which no non-
trivial equilibrium exists in the game Gm. (We know
that m∗ > 0 by Theorem 3.) Clearly, by choice of m∗,
if m < m∗, there is a nontrivial equilibrium in Gm.
Now suppose that m > m∗. By the construction of
m∗, there exists m′ with m > m′ ≥ m∗ such that no
nontrivial equilibrium exists in Gm′ . Let the greatest
equilibria with m′ and m be k′ and k, respectively. By
Theorem 4, k ≤ k′. Thus k is also trivial.
Figure 1 shows an example of the monetary crash
in the game with two types of agents (with parameters
αt, βt, γt, δt, ρt, χt) where thirty percent are of the first
type, there are 10 agents in the base economy, 100 repli-
cas, and the average amount of money is m. Formally,
the game is:
({(.05, 1, 1, .95, 1, 1), (.15, 1, 1, .95, 1, 1)}, (.3, .7), 10,m, 100).
Corollary 1 tells us that this crash is a very sharp
phenomenon; with some amount of money the system
performs well, but with just slightly more the system
stops working. This is a result of the way increasing
the amount of money affects agent’s best reply func-
tions. Figure 2, reproduced from our companion pa-
per Kash et al (2012), gives an example of a best reply
function with one type of agent. It shows, for a partic-
ular fixed value of m, how the optimal strategy for an
agent depends on the the strategies of the other agents.
Thus, an equilibrium is a point on the line y = x: the
optimal strategy is exactly the strategy the other agents
are using. In this simple case, increasingm causes every
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Average Amount of Money m
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
Fig. 1 Social welfare for various average amounts of money,
demonstrating a monetary crash.
point to shift downward (since strategies are discrete,
there may be some minimum increase for a particular
point to shift). With a large enough increase inm, every
point except (0,0) will be below the line and so there
will be no nontrivial equilibrium. The sharpness is a re-
sult of there being a critical value m∗ at which the last
point drops below the line.
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Fig. 2 A hypothetical best-reply function with one type of
agent.
In light of Corollary 1, the system designer should
try to find m∗, the point where social welfare is maxi-
mized. In doing so, it is helpful to have an understand-
ing of the types and strategies of agents in the systems,
an issue we discuss in Section 6. In practice, the system
designer may want to set the average amount of money
m to be somewhat less than m∗. Since there will be a
crash if m > m∗, small changes in the characteristics of
the population or mistakes by the designer in modeling
them could lead to a crash if she chooses m too close
to m∗.
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The phenomenon of a monetary crash is intimately
tied to our assumption of fixed prices. We saw such a
crash in practice in the babysitting co-op example. If
the price is allowed to float freely, we expect that, as
the money supply increases, there will be inflation; the
price will increase so as to avoid a crash. However, float-
ing prices can create other monetary problems, such
as speculation, booms, and busts. Floating prices also
impose transaction costs on agents. In systems where
prices would normally be relatively stable, these trans-
action costs may well outweigh the benefits of floating
prices, so a system designer may opt for fixed prices,
despite the risk of a crash.
We believe there may also be a happy medium be-
tween a single, permanent fixed price and prices that
change freely from round to round; indeed, our advice
to system designers points naturally toward it. In par-
ticular, our advice about how to optimize the amount
of money relies on experimentation and observation to
determine what agents are doing and what their util-
ities are. This information then tells the designer how
much money she should provide. Since adjusting the
amount of money is equivalent to adjusting prices, the
designer could incorporate this process into a price set-
ting rule. Depending on the nature of the system, this
could either be done manually over time (if the infor-
mation is difficult to gather and analyze) or automati-
cally (if the information gathering and analysis can it-
self be automated). From this perspective, a monetary
crash, though real, is not something to be feared. In-
stead, it is just a strong signal that the current price,
while probably not too far off from a very good price,
requires adjustment. Naturally, this relies on a process
that proceeds slow enough that agents myopically ig-
nore the effects of future price changes in determining
their current action.
Finally, a system designer could consider interven-
tions other than adjusting the amount of money. One
obvious opportunity is the process by which volunteers
are selected. Our model assumes this process is random,
but it need not be. For example, the system designer
could attempt to bias the process in favor of agents with
smaller amounts of money. Like increasing the average
amount of money, this could increase efficiency since
agents would spend less time with no money, but could
potentially cause a crash, since agents have less of an
incentive to save for the future. Our techniques rely on
the choice of agents being independent of how much
money they have, do not allow us to rigorously analyze
this situation. Biasing the volunteer selection rule is an
idea we return to in Section 5.3, as agents who create
sybils increase their probability of being chosen.
5 Dealing with Nonstandard Agents
The model in Section 2 defines the utility of standard
agents, who value service and dislike using their re-
sources to provide it to others. This seems like a natural
description of the way most people use distributed sys-
tems. However, in a real system, not every user will be-
have they way the designer intends. A practical system
needs to be robust to nonstandard behaviors. In this
section, we show how our model can be used to under-
stand the effects of four interesting types of nonstan-
dard behavior. First, an agent might provide service
even when he will receive nothing in return, behaving
as an altruist. Second, rather than viewing money as a
means to satisfy future requests, an agent might place
an inherent value on it and start hoarding it. Third,
an agent might create additional identities, known as
sybils, to try and manipulate the system. Finally, agents
might collude with each other.
The results of this section give a system designer
insight into how to design a scrip system that takes
into account (and is robust to) a number of frequently-
observed behaviors.
5.1 Altruists
P2P filesharing systems often have large numbers of
free riders; they work because a small number of altru-
istic users provide most of the files. For example, Adar
and Huberman 2000 found that, in the Gnutella net-
work, nearly 50 percent of responses are from the top
1 percent of sharing hosts. A wide variety of systems
have been proposed to discourage free riding. However,
according to our model, unless this system mostly elim-
inates the altruistic users, adding such a system will
have no effect on rational users.
To make this precise, take an altruist to be some-
one who always volunteers to fulfill requests, regardless
of whether the other agent can pay. Agent i might ra-
tionally behave altruistically if, rather than suffering a
loss of utility when satisfying a request, i derives posi-
tive utility from satisfying it. Such a utility function is
a reasonable representation of the pleasure that some
people get from the sense that they provide the music
that everyone is playing. For such altruistic agents, the
strategy of always volunteering is dominant. While hav-
ing a nonstandard utility function might be one reason
that a rational agent might use this strategy, there are
certainly others. For example a naive user of filesharing
software with a good connection might well follow this
strategy. All that matters for the following discussion
is that there are some agents that use this strategy, for
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whatever reason. For simplicity, we assume that all such
agents have the same type ta.
Suppose that a system has a altruists. Intuitively, if
a is moderately large, they will manage to satisfy most
of the requests in the system even if other agents do
no work. Thus, there is little incentive for any other
agent to volunteer, because he is already getting full
advantage of participating in the system. Based on this
intuition, it is a relatively straightforward calculation to
determine a value of a that depends only on the types,
but not the number n, of agents in the system, such
that the dominant strategy for all standard agents i is
to never volunteer to satisfy any requests.
Proposition 1 For all games (T, f , h,m, 1) with fta >
0, there exists a value a such that, if n > a/(ftah) (i.e.,
there are at least a altruists), then never volunteering
is a dominant strategy for all standard agents.
Proof Consider the strategy for a standard agent i in
the presence of a altruists. Even with no money, agent
i will get a request satisfied with probability 1 − (1 −
βta)
a just through the actions of the altruists. Consider
a round when agent i is chosen to make a request. If
he has no money (because he never volunteered), his
expected utility is γτ(i)(1 − (1 − βta)
a). His maximum
possible utility for the round is γτ(i). Thus, a strategy
where he volunteers can increase his utility for a round
by at most γτ(i)(1− βta)
a. Thus, even if the agent gets
every request satisfied, his expected utility can increase
by at most
(1− δτ(i))
∑∞
r=0
ρτ(i)
hn
γτ(i)(1− βta)
a(1−
1−δτ(i)
n
)r
= (1− δτ(i))(ρτ(i)/h)γτ(i)(1 − βta)
a/(1− δτ(i))
= (ρτ(i)/h)γτ(i)(1− βta)
a.
Clearly this expression goes to 0 as a goes to infinity. If
we take a large enough that the expression is less than
αt for all types t, then the value of having every future
request satisfied is less than the cost of volunteering
now, so no agent will ever volunteer.
Consider the following reasonable values for our pa-
rameters: βt = .01 (so that each player can satisfy 1% of
the requests), γt = 1, αt = .1 (a low but non-negligible
cost), δt = .9999/day (which corresponds to a yearly
discount factor of approximately 0.95), and an aver-
age of 1 request per day per player. Then as long as
a > 1145 to ensure that not volunteering is a domi-
nant strategy. While this is a large number, it is small
relative to the size of a large P2P network. While the
number of altruists needed to degrade the performance
of the system increases somewhat with the number of
agents, the point remains that a small fraction of altru-
ists can discourage the rest of the system from providing
service.
Proposition 1 shows that with enough altruists, the
system eventually experiences a monetary crash, since
all agents will use a threshold of zero. However, in-
teresting behavior can still arise with smaller numbers
of altruists. consider the situation where an a fraction
of requests are immediately satisfied at no cost with-
out the requester needing to ask for volunteers. Intu-
itively, these are the requests satisfied by the altruists,
although the following result also applies to any setting
where agents occasionally have a (free) outside option.
The following theorem shows that social welfare is in-
creasing in a.
Let G = ({t}, 1, h,m, n) be a game with a single
type for which the standard conditions hold. Consider
the family Ga of games (parameterized by a) that result
from G if a fraction a of requests can be satisfied at no
cost. That is, the game Ga is the same as G, except
that if an agent i makes a request, with probability a,
it is satisfied at no cost, and with probability 1 − a,
an agent is chosen among the volunteers to satisfy the
request, just as in G, and the i is charged 1 dollar to
have the request satisfied.
Theorem 5 For the interval of values of a where there
is no monetary crash in Ga, social welfare increases as
a increases (assuming that the greatest equilibrium is
played by all agents in Ga).
Proof An agent’s utility in a round where he makes a
request and it is satisfied at no cost is γt. Since such
rounds occur with probability a, by assumption, our
normalization guarantees that the sum of standard agents’
expected utilities in rounds where a request is satisfied
at no cost is aγt. The same analysis as in Section 4
shows that the sum of agents’ expected utilities in each
of the remaining rounds is (1 − a)(1 − ζ(a))(γt − αt),
where, as before, ζ(a) = d∗(t, 0, a), the equilibrium
value of d∗(t, 0) in the game Ga. Thus, expected utility
as a function of a is
aγt + (1− a)(1 − ζ(a))(γt − αt). (6)
To see that this expression increases as a increases, we
would like to take the derivative relative to a and show
it is positive. Unfortunately, ζ(a) may not even be con-
tinuous. Because strategies are integers, there will be
regions where ζ(a) is constant, and then a jump when
a critical value of a is reached that causes the equilib-
rium to change. At a point a in a region where ζ(a) is
constant, ζ′(a) = 0, so the derivative of Equation (6)
is γt − (1 − ζ(a))(γt − αt) > 0. Hence, social welfare is
increasing at such points.
Now consider a point a where ζ(a) is discontinuous.
Such a discontinutity occurs when the greatest equi-
librium, the greatest value k for which BRGa(k) = k,
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changes. We show that, for a fixed k, BRGa(k) is non-
increasing in a. Since increasing a can only cause the
BRGa(k) to decrease, the discontinuity must be caused
by a change from an equilibrium k to a new equilib-
rium k′ < k. Fix a vector k of thresholds, and let
pk,m,au be the probability that i will earn a dollar in
a given round if he is willing to volunteer, given that
a fraction a of requests is satisfied at no cost (so that
pk,m,0u is what we earlier called p
k,m
u ); we similarly de-
fine pk,m,ad , his probability of being chosen to make a
request. It is easy to see that pk,m,au = (1−a)p
k,m,0
u and
pk,m,ad = (1−a)p
k,m,0
d . The random variable J(κ, pu, pd)
in Equation (4) describes the first time at which an
agent starting with κ dollars and using the threshold κ
while earning a dollar with probability pu and spend-
ing a dollar with probability pd reaches zero dollars. As
a increases, pk,m,au and p
k,m,a
d both decrease, but the
ratio pk,m,au /p
k,m,a
d remains constant. Intuitively, this
means that the agent “slows down” his random walk
on amounts of money by a factor of 1/(1 − a). This
slowdown occurs because, each time the agent would
have an opportunity to volunteer or would have spent
a dollar, with probability a the opportunity is taken by
an altruist instead, so the expected time to take a step
increases by a factor of 1/(1 − a). Thus, the value of
the expectation in Equation (4), and hence the right-
hand side of Equation (4), decreasing as a function of
a. By Lemma 3, (BRGa(k))t is the maximum value of
κ such that Equation (4) is satisfied. Decreasing the
right-hand side can only decrease the maximum value
of κ, so BRGa(k) is non-increasing as a function of a.
By Lemma 4, λm,k is non-increasing in k (unless
the system crashes, after which it remains crashed even
when a is increased further, as in Corollary 1, where
the points at which social welfare is increasing form
an interval). Since, as we have just shown, if there is
a discontinuity at ζ(a) when a increases, the greatest
equilibrium changes at a from k to k′ < k, we must have
λm,k′ ≥ λm,k. In Equation (2) for i = 0, the value of
the numerator is independent of λ, but the denominator
with λm,k′ is greater than or equal to the denominator
with λm,k. Thus d
∗(t, 0, a) = ζ(a) is non-increasing at
a. By Equation (6), this means that expected utility is
increasing at a. Thus, in either case, social welfare is
increasing in a.
Theorem 5 and Proposition 1 combine to tell us that
a little altruism is good for the system, but too much
causes a crash. Figure 3 demonstrates this phenomenon.
As we saw in Section 4, such crashes are caused when
m, the average amount of money, is too large. By de-
creasing m appropriately, even relatively large values
of a can be exploited, as Figure 4 shows. The “social
welfare without adjustment” plot is the same data from
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Fraction of Requests Satisfied by Altruists
Social welfare without adjustment
Social welfare with adjustment
Average money with adjustment
Average money without adjustment
Fig. 4 m can be adjusted as a increases.
Figure 3, with the corresponding plot of the amount of
money horizontal since m was held fixed. By decreas-
ing the average amount of money appropriately as the
number of altruists increases, a system designer can in-
crease social welfare while avoiding a crash of the econ-
omy (the system will still function due to the presence
of altruists). Note that, in discussing social welfare, our
formulation excludes the welfare of the altruists, since
our focus here is on the effects of altruism on standard
agents.
5.2 Hoarders
Whenever a system allows agents to accumulate some-
thing, be it work done, as in SETI@home, friends on
online social networking sites, or “gold” in an online
game, a certain group of users seems to make it their
goal to accumulate as much of it as possible. In pur-
suit of this, they will engage in behavior that seems
irrational. For simplicity here, we model hoarders as
playing the strategy s∞. This means that they will vol-
unteer under all circumstances. Our analysis would not
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change significantly if we also required that they never
made a request for work. Our first result shows that,
for a fixed money supply, having more hoarders makes
standard agents worse off.
Consider a game G = (T, f , h,m, n) such that the
standard conditions hold. Consider the family Gfh of
games (parameterized by fh) that result from G if a
fraction fh of agents are hoarders. That is, Gfh = (T ×
{0, 1}, f ′, h′,m, n) where an agent of type (t, 0) is a stan-
dard agent of type t, but an agent of type (t, 1) is a
hoarder and always uses the strategy s∞ (his probabil-
ities are still determined by βt, ρt, and χt). Define f
′
by taking f ′(t,0) = (1 − fh)ft and f
′
(t,1) = fhft for all
types t. Let h′ be the smallest multiple of h such that
f(t,i)h
′ is an integer for all t and i. (We need to adjust
h because otherwise the number of agents in the base
game may not be well defined.) Finally, to account for
the changed h, let δ(t,i) = 1− (1− δt)h/h
′.
Theorem 6 In the family Gfh of games, social welfare
is non-increasing in fh (if the greatest equilibrium is
played by all agents in Gfh).
Proof Let k(fh) denote the greatest equilibrium in Gfh .
An increase in fh is equivalent to taking some num-
ber of standard agents and increasing their strategy
to s∞. It follows from Lemma 4 that BRGfh is non-
decreasing in fh, and so k(fh) is non-decreasing in fh.
Again by Lemma 4, λm,k(fh) is non-increasing in fh.
Let ζfh = 1/(1− fh)
∑
t d
∗((t, 0), 0, fh) be the fraction
of non-hoarders with zero dollars, where d∗((t, 0), 0, fh)
is the value of d∗((t, 0), 0) at the greatest equilibrium
of Gfh . By Equation (2), ζ(fh) is non-decreasing in fh.
Thus, social welfare is non-increasing in fh.
Hoarders do have a beneficial aspect. As we have
observed, a monetary crash occurs when a dollar be-
comes valueless, because there are no agents willing to
take it. However, with hoarders in the system, there is
always someone who will volunteer, so there cannot be
a crash. Thus, for any m, the greatest equilibrium will
be nontrivial and, by Theorem 4, social welfare keeps
increasing as m increases. So, in contrast to altruism,
where the appropriate response was to decrease m, the
appropriate response to hoarders is to increase m. In
fact, our results indicate that the optimal response to
hoarders is to make m infinite. This is due to our unre-
alistic assumption that hoarders would use the strategy
s∞ regardless of the value ofm. There is likely an upper
limit on the value of m in practice, since it is unlikely
that hoarders would be willing to hoard scrip if it is so
easily available.
5.3 Sybils
Unless identities in a system are tied to a real world
identity (for example by a credit card), it is effectively
impossible to prevent a single agent from having multi-
ple identities Douceur (2002). Nevertheless, there are a
number of techniques that can make it relatively costly
for an agent to do so. For example, Credence uses cryp-
tographic puzzles to impose a cost each time a new iden-
tity wishes to join the system Walsh and Sirer (2006).
Given that a designer can impose moderate costs to
sybilling, how much more need she worry about the
problem? In this section, we show that the gains from
creating sybils when others do not diminish rapidly, so
modest costs may well be sufficient to deter sybilling
by typical users. However, sybilling is a self-reinforcing
phenomenon. As the number of agents with sybils gets
larger, the cost to being a non-sybilling agent increases,
so the incentive to create sybils becomes stronger. There-
fore, measures to discourage or prevent sybilling should
be taken early before this reinforcing trend can start.
Finally, we examine the behavior of systems where only
a small fraction of agents have sybils. We show that un-
der these circumstances a wide variety of outcomes are
possible (even when all agents are of a single type),
ranging from a crash (where no service is provided) to
an increase in social welfare. This analysis provides in-
sight into the tradeoffs between efficiency and stability
that occur when controlling the money supply of the
system’s economy.
When an agent of type t creates sybils, the only
parameter of his type that may change as a result is χt,
if we redefine the likelihood of an agent being chosen
to be the likelihood of the agent or any of his sybils
being chosen. The other parameters, such as ρ, remain
unchanged because there is no particular reason that
having multiple identities should cause the agent to,
for example, desire service more often. For simplicity,
we assume that each sybil is as likely to be chosen as the
original agent, so creating s sybils increases χt by sχt.
(Sybils may have other impacts on the system, such
as increased search costs, but we expect these to be
minor.)
Increasing χt benefits an agent by increasing his
value of ωt and thus pu, his probability of earning a dol-
lar (see Equation (8) in Appendix A). When pu < pd,
the agent has more opportunities to spend money than
to earn money, so he will regularly have requests go
unsatisfied due to a lack of money. In this case, the
fraction of requests he has satisfied is roughly pu/pd, so
increasing pu by creating sybils results in a roughly lin-
ear increase in utility. As Theorem 7 shows, when pu is
close to pd, the increase in satisfied requests is no longer
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Fig. 6 The effect of sybils on utility
linear, so the benefit of increasing pu begins to dimin-
ish. Finally, when pu > pd, most of the agent’s requests
are being satisfied, so the benefit from increasing pu is
very small. Figure 5 illustrates an agent’s utility as pu
varies for pd = .0001.
4 We formalize the relationship
between pu, pd, and the agent’s utility in the following
theorem, whose proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 7 Fix a game G and vector of thresholds k.
Let Rk,t = p
k,t
u /p
t
d. In the limit as the number of rounds
goes to infinity, the fraction of the agent’s requests that
have an agent willing and able to satisfy them that get
satisfied is (Rk,t − R
kt+1
k,t )/(1 −R
kt+1
k,t ) if Rk,t 6= 1 and
kt/(kt + 1) if Rk,t = 1.
Theorem 7 gives insight into the equilibrium behav-
ior with sybils. Clearly, if sybils have no cost, then cre-
4 Except where otherwise noted, the remaining figures in
this section assume that m = 4, n = 10000 and that there is
a single type of rational agent with α = .08, β = .01, γ = 1,
δ = .97, ρ = 1, and χ = 1. These values are chosen solely
for illustration, and are representative of a broad range of
parameter values. The figures are based on calculations of
the equilibrium behavior.
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Fig. 7 Sybils can improve utility
ating as many as possible is a dominant strategy. How-
ever, in practice, we expect there is some modest over-
head involved in creating and maintaining a sybil, and
that a designer can take steps to increase this cost with-
out unduly burdening agents. With such a cost, adding
a sybil might be valuable if pu is much less than pd, and
a net loss otherwise. This makes sybils a self-reinforcing
phenomenon. When a large number of agents create
sybils, agents with no sybils have their pu significantly
decreased. This makes them much worse off and makes
sybils much more attractive to them. Figure 6 shows
an example of this effect. This self-reinforcing quality
means that it is important to take steps to discourage
the use of sybils before they become a problem. Luckily,
Theorem 7 also suggests that a modest cost to create
sybils will often be enough to prevent agents from cre-
ating them because with a well chosen value of m, few
agents should have low values of pu.
We have interpreted Figures 5 and 6 as being about
changes in χ due to sybils, but the results hold regard-
less of what caused differences in χ. For example, agents
may choose a volunteer based on characteristics such as
connection speed or latency. If these characteristics are
difficult to verify and do impact decisions, our results
show that agents have a strong incentive to lie about
them. This also suggests that the decision about what
sort of information the system should enable agents to
share involves tradeoffs. If advertising legitimately al-
lows agents to find better service or more services they
may be interested in, then advertising can increase so-
cial welfare. But if these characteristics impact deci-
sions but have little impact on the actual service, then
allowing agents to advertise them can lead to a situ-
ation like that in Figure 6, where some agents have a
significantly worse experience.
We have seen that when a large fraction of agents
have sybils, those agents without sybils tend to be starved
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Fig. 8 Sybils can cause a crash
of opportunities to work (i.e. they have a low value of
pu). However, as Figure 6 shows, when a small frac-
tion of agents have sybils this effect (and its corre-
sponding cost) is small. Surprisingly, if there are few
agents with sybils, an increase in the number of sybils
these agents have can actually result in a decrease of
their effect on the other agents. Because agents with
sybils are more likely to be chosen to satisfy any par-
ticular request, they are able to use lower thresholds
and reach those thresholds faster than they would with-
out sybils, so fewer are competing to satisfy any given
request. Furthermore, since agents with sybils can al-
most always pay to make a request, they can provide
more opportunities for other agents to satisfy requests
and earn money. Social welfare is essentially propor-
tional to the number of satisfied requests (and is ex-
actly proportional to it if everyone shares the same val-
ues of α and γ), so a small number of agents with a
large number of sybils can improve social welfare, as
Figure 7 shows. Note that, although social welfare in-
creases, some agents may be worse off. For example, for
the choice of parameters in this example, social welfare
increases when twenty percent of agents create at least
two sybils, but agents without sybils are worse off unless
the twenty percent of agents with sybils create at least
eight sybils. As the number of agents with sybils in-
creases, they start competing with each other for oppor-
tunities to earn money and so adopt higher thresholds,
and this benefit disappears. This is what causes the
discontinuity in Figure 6 when approximately a third
of the agents have sybils.
This observation about the discontinuity also sug-
gests another way to mitigate the negative effects of
sybils: increase the amount of money in the system.
This effect can be seen in Figure 8, where for m = 2
social welfare is very low with sybils but by m = 4 it is
higher than it would be without sybils.
Unfortunately, increasing the average amount of money
has its own problems. Recall from Section 4 that, if the
average amount of money per agent is too high, the sys-
tem will crash. It turns out than just a small number
of agents creating sybils can have the same effect, as
Figure 8 shows. With no sybils, the point at which so-
cial welfare stops increasing and the system crashes is
between m = 10.25 and m = 10.5 (we only calculated
social welfare for values of m that are multiples of 0.25,
so we do not know the exact point of the crash). If one-
fifth of the agents each create a single sybil, the system
crashes if m = 9.5, a point where, without sybils, the
social welfare was near optimal. Thus, if the system de-
signer tries to induce optimal behavior without taking
sybils into account, the system will crash. Moreover,
because of the possibility of a crash, raising m to tol-
erate more sybils is effective only if m was already set
conservatively.
This discussions shows that the presence of sybils
can have a significant impact on the tradeoff between
efficiency and stability. Setting the money supply high
can increase social welfare, but at the price of making
the system less stable. Moreover, as the following the-
orem shows, whatever efficiencies can be achieved with
sybils can be achieved without them, at least if there
is only one type of agent. In the theorem, we consider
a system where all agents have the same type t. Sup-
pose that some subset of the agents have created sybils,
and all the agents in the subset have created the same
number of sybils. We can model this by simply taking
the agents in the subsets to have a new type s, which is
identical to t except that the value of χ increases. Thus,
we state our results in terms of systems with two types
of agents, t and s.
Theorem 8 Suppose that t and s are two types that
agree except for the value of χ, and that χt < χs. If k =
(kt, ks) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for G = ({t, s}, f , h,m, n)
with social welfare w, then there exist h′, m′, and n′
such that k′ = (ks) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for G
′
h′,m′,n′ =
({t}, {1}, h′,m′, n′) with social welfare greater than w.
We defer proof of Theorem 8 to Appendix B.
The analogous result for systems with more than
one type of agent is not true. Figure 6 shows a game
with a single type of agent, some of whom have created
two sybils. However, we can reinterpret it as a game
with two types of agents, one of whom has a larger
value of χ. With this reinterpretation, Figure 6 shows
that social welfare is higher when all the agents are
of the type th with the higher value of χ than when
only 40% are. Moreover, if only 40% of the agents have
type th, social welfare would increase if the remaining
agents created two sybils each (resulting in all agents
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having the higher value of χ). Note that this situation,
where there are two types of agents, of which one has a
higher value of χ, is exactly the situation considered by
Theorem 8. Thus, the theorem shows that for any equi-
librium with two such types of agents, there is a better
equilibrium where one of those types creates sybils so
as to effectively create only one type of agent.
While situations like this show that it is theoreti-
cally possible for sybils to increase social welfare be-
yond what is possible to achieve by simply adjusting
the average amount of money, this outcome seems un-
likely in practice. It relies on agents creating just the
right number of sybils. For situations where such a pre-
cise use of sybils would lead to a significant increase in
social welfare, a designer could instead improve social
welfare by biasing the algorithm agents use for selecting
which volunteer will satisfy the request.
Thus far, we have assumed that when agents cre-
ate sybils the amount of money in the system does not
change. However, the presence of sybils increases the
number of apparent agents in the system. Since social
welfare depends on the average amount of money per
agent, if the system designer mistakes these sybils for
an influx of new users and increases the money supply
accordingly, she will actually end up increasing the av-
erage amount of money in the system, and may cause a
crash. This emphasizes the need for continual monitor-
ing of the system rather that just using simple heuristics
to set the average amount of money, an issue we discuss
more in Section 6.
5.4 Collusion
Agents that collude gain two major benefits. The pri-
mary benefit is that they can share money,5 which makes
them less likely to run out of money (and hence unable
to make a request), and allows them to pursue a joint
strategy for determining when to work. A secondary
benefit, but important in particular for larger collusive
groups, is that they can satisfy each other’s requests.
The effects of collusion on the rest of the system de-
pend crucially on whether agents are able to volunteer
to satisfy requests when they personally cannot satisfy
the request but one of their colluding partners can. In
a system where a request is for computation, it seems
relatively straightforward for an agent to pass the com-
putation to a partner to perform and then pass the
answer back to the requester. On the other hand, if a
request is a piece of a file it seems less plausible that
5 We assume that colluding agents act to maximize the
sum of their utilities. Of course, this may not be optimal
for any particular agent, so sustaining collusion is a problem
for would-be colluders.
an agent would accept a download from an unexpected
source, and it seems wasteful to have the chosen vol-
unteer download it for the sole purpose of immediately
uploading it. If it is possible for colluders to pass off
requests in this fashion, they are able to effectively act
as sybils for each other, with all the consequences dis-
cussed in Section 5.3. However, if agents can volunteer
only for requests they can personally satisfy, the effects
of collusion are almost entirely positive.
Since we have already discussed the consequences of
sybils, we will assume that agents are able to volunteer
only to satisfy requests that they personally can sat-
isfy. Furthermore, we make the simplifying assumption
that agents that collude are of the same type, because
if agents of different types collude their strategic deci-
sions become more complicated. For example, once the
colluding group has accumulated a certain amount of
money, it may wish to have only members with small
values of α volunteer to satisfy requests; or when it is
low on money, it may wish to deny use of money to
members with low values of γ. This results in strate-
gies that involve sets of thresholds rather than a single
threshold. While there seems to be nothing fundamen-
tally different about the situation, it makes calculations
significantly more difficult.
With these assumptions, we now examine how col-
luding agents will behave. Because colluding agents share
money and types, it is irrelevant which members ac-
tually perform work and have money. All that mat-
ters is the total amount of money the group has. This
means that when the group needs money, everyone in
the group volunteers for a job; otherwise, no one does.
Thus, the group essentially acts like a single agent, us-
ing a threshold that is somewhat less than the sum of
the thresholds that the individual agents would have
used, because it is less likely that c agents will make ck
requests in rapid succession than a single agent mak-
ing k. Furthermore, some requests will not require scrip
at all because they can potentially be satisfied by other
members of the colluding group.When deciding whether
the group should satisfy a member’s request or ask for
an outside volunteer to fulfill it, the group must decide
whether it should pay a cost of α to avoid spending
a dollar. Since not spending a dollar is effectively the
same as earning a dollar, the decision is already opti-
mized by the threshold strategy; the group should al-
ways attempt to satisfy a request internally unless it is
in a temporary situation where the group is above its
threshold.
Figure 9 shows an example of the effects of collu-
sion on agents’ utilities as the size of collusive groups
increases. As this figure suggests, the effects typically go
through three phases. Initially, the fraction of requests
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Fig. 9 The effect of collusion on utility
colluders satisfy for each other is small. This means
that each collusive group must work for others to pay
for almost every request its members make. However,
since they share money, the colluders do not have to
work as often as individuals would. Thus, other agents
have more opportunity to work, and every agent’s pu
increases, making all agents better off.
As the number of colluders increases, the fraction
of requests they satisfy internally grows significant. We
can think of pd as decreasing in this case, and view
these requests as being satisfied “outside” the scrip sys-
tem because no scrip changes hands. This is good for
colluders, but is bad for other agents whose pu is lower,
since fewer requests are being made. Even in this range,
non-colluding agents still tend to be better off than if
there were no colluders, because the overall competition
for opportunities to work is still lower. Finally, once
the collusive group is large enough, it will have a low
pd relative to pu. This means the collusive group can
use a very low threshold, which again begins improv-
ing utility for all agents. The analogous situation with
sybils is transitory, and disappears when more agents
create sybils. However, with collusion, this low thresh-
old is an inherent consequence of colluders satisfying
each other’s requests, and so persists and even increases
as the amount of collusion in the system increases. Since
collusion is difficult to maintain (the problem of incen-
tivizing agents to contribute is the whole point of us-
ing scrip), we would expect the size of collusive groups
seen in practice to be relatively small. Therefore, we
expect that for most systems collusion will make no
agent worse off, and some better off. Note that, as with
sybils, the decreased in competition that results from
collusion can also lead to a crash. However, if the sys-
tem designer is monitoring the system, and encouraging
and expecting collusion, she can reducem appropriately
and prevent a crash.
These results also suggest that creating the ability
to take out loans (with an appropriate interest rate)
is likely to be beneficial. Loans gain the benefits of
reduced competition without the accompanying cost
of fewer requests being made in the system. However,
implementing a loan mechanism requires addressing a
number of other incentive problems. For example, white-
washing, where agents take on a new identity (in this
case to escape debts) needs to be prevented Friedman and Resnick
(2001).
6 Identifying User Strategies
Lemma 2 used relative entropy to derive an explicit
formula for the distribution of money d∗ given a game
(T, f , h, n,m) and vector of strategies k. In this section,
we want to go in the opposite direction: given the dis-
tribution of money, we want to infer the strategies k,
the set of types present T , and the fraction of each type
f . For those interested in understanding the agents us-
ing a scrip system, knowing the fraction of agents using
each strategy can provide a window into the preferences
of those agents. For system designers, this knowledge
is useful because, as we show in Section 4, how much
money the system can handle without crashing depends
on the fraction of agents of each type.
In equilibrium, the distribution of money has the
form described in Lemma 2. Note that, in general, we
do not expect to see exactly this distribution at any
given time, but it follows from Theorem 1 that, after
sufficient time, the distribution is unlikely to be very
far from it. Does this distribution help us identify the
strategies and types of agents?
As a first step to answering this question, given a
distribution of money d (where d(i) is the fraction of
agents with i dollars) such that d(i) is a rational num-
ber for all i (this constraint is necessary if d(i) is to
represent the fraction of agents with i dollars in a real
system), suppose that the maximum amount of money
to which d gives positive probability is K. A vector
f of length K + 1 whose components are all rational
numbers, where fi is intuitively the fraction of agents
playing the threshold strategy si, is an explanation of
d if there exists a λ such that
d(j) =
∑
i
dλ(i, j),
where
dλ(i, j) = fiλ
j/(
i∑
l=0
λl) (7)
if j ≤ i and 0 otherwise. Note that Equation (7) is very
similar to Equation (2) from Lemma 2. In the following
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lemma, we show why we call f an explanation: given a
distribution d and an explanation f we can find a game
G where f is the fraction of agents of each type and
d is the equilibrium distribution of money (by which
we mean that the value of d∗ in Lemma 2 is such that
d(i) =
∑
t d
∗(t, i)). Note that this definition implicitly
assumes that wt = 1 for all t, a point to which we return
later.
Lemma 5 If f is an explanation for d, then there ex-
ists a game G = (T, f , h,m, n) and vector k of thresh-
olds such that k is an ε-Nash equilibrium for G and the
equilibrium distribution of money is d.
Proof Let T = {0, . . . ,K}, h be the minimum integer
such that hd(i) is an integer for all i, m =
∑
i id(i), and
k be such that ki = i. For each type i, choose βi, χi, and
ρi arbitrarily, subject to the constraint that βχ/ρ = 1
(so that, by definition, ωi = 1 for all types i). Finally,
choose an arbitrary n.
By Lemma 3, for any n, an optimal threshold policy
in the MDP PG,S(k),i for an agent of type i is sκ, where
κ is the maximum value such that
αt ≤ E[(1− (1 − δt)/n)
J(κ,pu,pd)]γt. (4)
Fix δi and γi, and let g(κ) be the sequence of values of
the right hand side of Equation (4) for natural num-
bers κ. Recall that the random variable J(κ, pu, pd)
represents the round at which an agent starting with
κ dollars runs out of money. Since J(0, pu, pd) = 0 for
all histories, g(0) = γt. The time at which an agent
runs out of money is increasing in his initial amount of
money. Thus, J(κ, pu, pd) is a strictly increasing func-
tion of κ, so g(κ) is strictly decreasing. Choose αi such
that g(i+ 1) < αi < g(i).
Thus, we have established parameters (αi, βi, γi, δi, χi, ρi)
for each type i so that si an optimal policy for agents
of type i in the MDP PG,S(k),i. By Theorem 2, taking n
and the δi sufficiently large makes k a ε-Nash equilib-
rium for G. By Lemma 2, the equilibrium distribution
of money is d.
In general, there is not a unique explanation of a
distribution d. Say that a distribution of money d is
fully-supported if there do not exist i and j such that
i < j, d(j) > 0, and d(i) = 0. For any game G, if
all agents play threshold strategies then the resulting
distribution will be fully-supported because it has the
form given in Lemma 2. As the following lemma shows,
a fully-supported distribution can be explained in an
infinite number of different ways.
Lemma 6 If d is a fully-supported distribution of money
with finite support, then there exist an infinite number
of explanations of d.
We defer the proof of Lemma 6 to Appendix C.
Lemma 6 shows that d has an infinite number of
explanations. Lemma 5 shows that we can find an (ap-
proximate) equilibrium corresponding to each of them.
The explanations f we construct in the proof of Lemma 6
seem unnatural; typically fi > 0 for all i. We are inter-
ested in a more parsimonious explanation, one that has
a small support (i.e., the number of thresholds i for
which fi > 0 is small), for reasons the following lemma
makes clear.
Lemma 7 Let f be an explanation for d. If s is the
size of the support of f , then any other explanation will
have a support of size at least K − s.
Proof Suppose that f is an explanation for d. By Lemma 5,
there is a game G = (T, f , h,m, n) and vector k of
thresholds such that k is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for G
and the equilibrium distribution of money is d. More-
over, the proof of Lemma 5 shows that we can take T =
{0, . . . ,K}, ki = i, and ωi = 1 for each type i ∈ T . By
Equation (2) in Lemma 2, d∗(t, i) = ftλ
iq(t, i)/
∑kt
j=0 λ
jq(t, j),
where λ is the (unique) value that satisfies Equation (3).
We first show that if fi−1 = 0, then d(i)/d(i − 1) = λ.
Since, for all i, ωi = 1, it is immediate from the defini-
tion of q for Lemma 2 that q(i, j) = q(i, j′) for all j and
j′. Thus, the q terms cancel, so d∗(i, j) = fiλ
j/
∑ki
l=0 λ
l.
Let bi = fi/
∑ki
l=0 λ
l; then d∗(i, j) = λjbi. Only agents
with a threshold of at least j can have j dollars, so
d(j) =
∑
j
d∗(i, j) =
∑
{tl:l≥j}
d∗(l, j) =
∑
{tl:l≥j}
blλ
j = Bjλ
j ,
where Bj =
∑
{tl:l≥i}
bl. If fi−1 = 0, then Bi = Bi−1,
so d(i)/d(i− 1) = λ.
Since s strategies get positive probability according
to f , at least k−s of the ratios d(i)/d(i−1) with 1 ≤ i ≤
K must have value λ. Any other explanation f ′ will have
different coefficients fi in Equation (7), so the value
λ′ satisfying it will also differ (since the requirement
that d(K) = dλ(K,K) uniquely defines a value of λ).
This means that the K − s ratios with value λ must
correspond to strategies i such that fi > 0. Thus, the
support of any other explanation must be at leastK−s.
If s ≪ K, Lemma 7 gives us a strong reason for
preferring the minimal explanation (i.e., the one with
the smallest support); any other explanation will in-
volve significantly more types of agents being present.
For s = 3 and K = 50, the smallest explanation has
a support of three thresholds, and thus requires three
types; the next smallest explanation requires at least
47 types. Thus, if the number of types of agents is rela-
tively small, the minimal explanation will be the correct
one.
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The proof of Lemma 7 also gives us an algorithm for
finding this minimal explanation. Since d(i) = Biλ
i,
taking logs of both sides, log d(i) = logBi + i logλ.
Because Bi is constant in ranges of i where fti = 0,
a plot of log d(i) will be a line with slope λ in these
ranges. Thus, the minimal explanation can be found by
finding the minimum number of lines of constant slope
that fit the data. For a simple example of how such a
distribution might look, Figure 10 shows an equilibrium
distribution of money for the game
({(.05, 1, 1, .95, 1), (.15, 1, 1, .95, 1)}, (.3, .7), 10, 4, 100)
so the only difference between the types is that it costs
the second type three times as much to satisfy a re-
quest) and the equilibrium strategy profile (20, 13). Fig-
ure 11 has the same distribution plotted on a log scale.
Note the two lines with the same slope (λ) and the
break at 13.
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Amount of Money
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 A
ge
nt
s
Fig. 10 Distribution of money with two types of agents.
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Fig. 11 Log of the distribution of money with two types of
agents.
Our notion of an explanation requires that f sat-
isfy Equation (7), which, unlike Equation (2), does not
contain a q(t, i) term. Thus, it implicitly assumes that
for all types t, ωt = 1. Note that the game G in the
proof of Lemma 7 was constructed so at to ensure that
ωt = 1 for all types t. When ωt is allowed to differ, we
no longer have the simple form for Bi used in Lemma 7.
This is because the types do not share the same value
of ωt. However, for a single type t it is the case that
d∗(t, i)/d∗(t, i − 1) = λωt. ωτ(j) can be estimated by
observing the results of requests, so by observing a suf-
ficient number of agents the system designer should be
able to estimate the values d∗(t, i) and ωt for some type
t and thus learn λ. If several, but not all, types t have a
common value of ωt, the procedure above can be used
to determine ft and kt for each type and the resulting
value of λ.
This procedure allows us to use a distribution of
money to infer the minimal explanation of the number
of types of agents: the fraction of the population com-
posed of each type, and the strategy each type is play-
ing. (Note that we cannot distinguish multiple types
with a shared ωt playing the same strategy.) We would
like to use this information to learn about the prefer-
ences of agents: their values of αt, γt, and δt. Lemma 3
shows how we can do this. Once we find an explana-
tion, the value of λ determines ptu and p
t
d for each type
t. Then Equation 4 puts constraints on the values of
αt, βt, and γt. Over time, if T , the set of types, re-
mains constant, but f , n, and m all vary as agents join
and leave the system, a later observation with a slightly
would give another equilibrium with new constraints on
the types of the agents. A number of such observations
potentially reveal enough information to allow strong
inferences about agent types.
Thus far we have implicitly assumed that there are
only a small number of types of agents in a system.
Given that a type is defined by six real numbers, it
is perhaps more reasonable to assume that each agent
has a different type, but there is a small number of
“clusters” of agents with similar types. For example, we
might believe that generally agents either place a high
value or a low value on receiving service. While the ex-
act value may vary, the types of two low-value agents
or two high-value agents will be quite similar. We have
also assumed in our analysis that all agents play their
optimal threshold strategy. However, computing this
optimum may be too difficult for many agents. Even
ignoring computational issues, agents may have insuf-
ficient information about their exact type or the exact
types of other agents to compute the optimal thresh-
old strategy. Both the assumption that there are a few
clusters of agents with similar, but not identical, types
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and the assumption that agents do not necessarily play
their optimal threshold strategy, but do play a strategy
close to optimal, lead to a similar picture of a system,
which is one that we expect to see in practice: we will
get clusters of agents playing similar strategies (that is,
strategies with thresholds clustered around one value),
rather than all agents in a cluster playing exactly the
same strategy. This change has relatively little impact
on our results. Rather than seeing straight lines rep-
resenting populations with a sharp gap between them,
as in Figure 11, we expect slightly curved lines repre-
senting a cluster of similar populations, with somewhat
smoother transitions.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have examined some of the practical
implications of the the theoretical results about scrip
systems from our companion paper Kash et al (2012).
For those interested in studying the agents of scrip sys-
tems, our characterization of equilibrium distribution
of money forms the basis for techniques relevant to in-
ferring characteristics of the agents of a scrip system
from the distribution of money. For a system designer,
our results on optimizing the money supply provide a
simple maxim: keep adding money until the system is
about to experience a monetary crash.
We have also seen that our model can be used to un-
derstand the effects of nonstandard agent behavior on
a scrip system. It provides insight into the effects of al-
truists and hoarders on a scrip system and guidance to
system designers for dealing with them (less and more
money respectively). Sybils are generally bad, but can
typically be discouraged by imposing a moderate cost
and possibly biasing the process for selecting a volun-
teer. On the other hand, collusion tends to be a net
benefit and should be encouraged. Indeed, the entire
purpose of the system is to allow users to collude and
provide each other with service despite incentives to
free ride.
We remark that we are not the first to study the
effects of altruists, sybils, and collusion on system be-
havior (although we believe we are the first to study
it in the context of scrip systems). Work on the evo-
lution of cooperation stresses the importance of altru-
ists willing to undertake costly punishment Hauert et al
(2007). Yokoo et al. 2004 studied the effects of sybils in
auctions. Solution concepts such as strong Nash equilib-
rium Aumann (1959) and k-t robust equilibrium Abraham et al
(2006) explicitly address collusion in games; Hayrapetyan
et al. 2006 study collusion in congestion games and find
cases where, as with scrip systems, collusion is actually
beneficial.
Although we believe that our analysis should al-
ready provide a great deal of insight to a system de-
signer hoping to use a scrip system, many interesting
open questions remain for future work. To name a few:
– Our model makes a number of strong predictions
about the agent strategies, distribution of money,
and effects of variations in the money supply. It also
provides techniques to help analyze characteristics
of agents of a scrip system. It would be interesting
to test these predictions on a real functioning scrip
system to either validate the model or gain insight
from where its predictions are incorrect.
– In many systems there are overlapping communities
of various sizes that are significantly more likely to
be able to satisfy each other’s requests. For exam-
ple, in a P2P filesharing system, people are more
likely to be able to satisfy the requests of others
who share the same interests. It would be interest-
ing to investigate the effect of such communities on
the equilibrium of our system.
– It seems unlikely that altruism and hoarding are the
only two types of “irrational” behavior we will find
in real systems. Are there other major types that
our model can provide insight into? Furthermore,
it seems natural that the behavior of a very small
group of agents should not be able to change the
overall behavior of the system. Can we prove results
about equilibria and utility when a small group fol-
lows an arbitrary strategy? This is particularly rel-
evant when modeling attackers. See Abraham et al
(2006) for general results in this setting.
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A Definition of the MDP
In this appendix, we repeat the formal definition of the MDP
from our companion paper Kash et al (2012). Taking notation
from Puterman 1994, we formally define the MDP PG,S(k),t =
(S,A, p(· | s, a), r(s, a)) that describes the game where all the
agents other than i are playing S(k)−i and i has type t.
– S = {0, . . . ,mhn} is the set of possible states for the MDP
(i.e., the possible amounts of money compatible with the
distribution d∗).
– A = {0, 1} is the set of possible actions for the agent,
where 0 denotes not volunteering and 1 denotes volun-
teering iff another agent who has at least one dollar makes
a request.
– pu is the probability of earning a dollar, assuming the
agent volunteers (given that all other agents have fixed
their thresholds according to k and the distribution of
money is exactly d∗. Each agent of type t′ who wishes
to volunteer can do so with probability βt′ . Assuming ex-
actly the expected number of agents are able to volunteer,
υt′ = βt′(ft′−d
∗(t′, kt′))n agents of type t
′ volunteer. Note
that we are disregarding the effect of i in computing the
υt′ , since this will have a negligible effect for large n. Using
the υts, we can express pu as the product of two proba-
bilities: that some agent other than i who has a dollar is
chosen to make a request and that i is the agent chosen
to satisfy it. Thus,
pu =
(∑
t′
ρt′(ft′ − d
∗(t′, 0))
)(
χtβt∑
t′ χt′υt′
)
. (8)
– pd is the probability of agent i having a request satis-
fied, given that agent i has a dollar. Given that all agents
are playing a threshold strategy, if the total number n of
agents is sufficiently large, then it is almost certainly the
case that some agent will always be willing and able to
volunteer. Thus, we can take pd to be the probability that
agent i will be chosen to make a request; that is,
pd =
ρt
hn
(9)
– r(s, a) is the (immediate) expected reward for performing
action a in state s. Thus, r(s, 0) = γtpd if s > 0; r(0, 0) = 0;
r(s, 1) = γtpd − αtpu if s > 0; and r(0, 1) = −αtpu.
– p(s′ | s, a) is the probability of being in state s′ after
performing action a in state s; p(s′ | s, a) is determined by
pu and pd; specifically, p(s+1 | s, 1) = pu, p(s− 1 | s, a) =
pd if s > 0, and the remainder of the probability is on
p(s | s, a) (i.e., p(s | s, a) = 1−(p(s+1 | s, 1)+p(s−1 | s, a)).
– u∗(s) is the expected utility of being in state s if agent i
uses the optimal policy for the MDP PG,S(k),t
– u(s, a) is the expected utility for performing action a in
state s, given that the optimal strategy is followed after
this action;
u(s, a) = r(s, a) + δ
mhn∑
s′=0
p(s′ | s, a)u∗(s′).
B Proofs from Section 5
Theorem 7. Fix a game G and vector of thresholds k. Let
Rk,t = p
k,t
u /p
t
d. In the limit as the number of rounds goes to in-
finity, the fraction of the agent’s requests that have an agent
willing and able to satisfy them that get satisfied is (Rk,t −
Rkt+1
k,t )/(1− R
kt+1
k,t ) if Rk,t 6= 1 and kt/(kt + 1) if Rk,t = 1.
Proof Consider the Markov chain M that results from fix-
ing the agent’s policy to skt in PG,S(k),t. M satisfies the
requirements to have a limit distribution (see Theorem A.1
of Kash et al (2012)). It can be easily verified that the dis-
tribution gives the agent probability Ri(1−R)/(1−Rk+1) of
having i dollars if R 6= 1 and probability 1/(k + 1) if R = 1
satisfies the detailed balance condition and thus is the limit
distribution. This gives the probabilities given in the theorem.
Theorem 8. Suppose that t and s are two types that agree
except for the value of χ, and that χt < χs. If k = (kt, ks) is an
ε-Nash equilibrium for G = ({t, s}, f , h,m, n) with social welfare
w, then there exist m′, and n′ such that k′ = (ks) is an ε-Nash
equilibrium for G′
m′,n′
= ({t}, {1}, h,m′, n′) with social welfare
greater than w.
Proof We prove the theorem by finding m′, and n′ such that
agents in G′
m′,n′
that play some strategy k get essentially the
same utility that an agent with sybils would by playing that
strategy in G. Since ks was the optimal strategy for agents
with sybils in G, it must be optimal in Gm′,n′ as well. Since
agents with sybils have utility at least as great as those with-
out, social welfare will be at least as large in G′
m′,n′
as in G.
To do so, we find a value of m′ so that, from his perspective,
being in G with sybils or G′ without results in exactly the
same MDP. The natural way to do so is to treat m′ as a con-
tinuous value, which might result in a value such that hm′n
(the total amount of money) is not an integer. To complete
the proof, we show that an n′ can be found that allows us to
avoid this problem.
Since an agent can earn a dollar only if he is able to
satisfy the current request, 0 < pm,k,su < βs. The constraint
that hm′n′, the total amount of money, is a natural number
means that m′ must be a rational number. For the moment,
we ignore that constraint and allow m′ to take on any value
in [0, k′t]. From Equation (8), p
m′,k′,t
u is continuous in d∗q
k′
,
which, by Lemma 2, is continuous in λm′,k′ and thus m
′.
We use this continuity to show that we can find a value of
m′ such that pm,k,su = p
m′,k′,t
u . By Equation (3), if m′ = 0
then d∗q
k′
,m(t, 0) = 1, and if m
′ = k′t then d
∗
q
k′
,m(t, k
′
t) = 1.
Combining these with Equation (8) gives p0,k
′,t
u = 0 and
pm
′,k′,t
u = βt. Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
there exists an m′ such that pm,k,su = p
m′,k′,t
u . For this choice
of m′, observe that by Lemma 3, PG,S(k),s and PGm′ ,S(κ′),t
have the same optimal threshold policy.
If m′ is rational, say m′ = a/b, take n′ = bn; then hm′n′ is
an integer and, by the argument above, k′ is an equilibrium
for Gm′,n′ . Since p
m′,k′
u = p
k,s
u > p
k,t
u , we must have ζGm′,n′ <
ζG. Thus, social welfare has increased. If m′ is not rational,
we instead use a rational value m′′ sufficiently close to m′
that k′ is still an equilibrium for Gm′,n′ and ζGm′′ ,n′′ < ζG.
C Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6. If d is a fully-supported distribution of money with
finite support, there exist an infinite number of explanations of
d.
Proof Fix λ. The distribution d and λ determine an expla-
nation f as follows. By Equation (7), we need f to satisfy
d(j) =
∑K
i=0 dλ(i, j).
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Recall that K is the maximum value for which d(K) > 0.
Start by considering fK . By the definition of dλ, dλ(i, j) = 0
if j > i. Thus, the constraint becomes
d(K) = dλ(K,K) = fKλ
K/(
K∑
l=0
λl).
Take fK to be the unique value that satisfies this equation.
Once we have defined fK , again apply the constraint and take
fK−1 to be the unique value that satisfies
d(K − 1) = dλ(K,K − 1) + dλ(K − 1,K − 1)
= fKλ
K−1/(
K∑
l=0
λl) + fK−1λ
K−1/(
K−1∑
l=0
λl).
Iterating this process uniquely defines f as the unique value
that satisfies
d(j) =
K∑
i=j
dλ(i, j) =
K∑
i=j
fiλ
j/(
i∑
l=0
λl),
or
fi = (
i∑
l=0
λl)/λi

d(i)− K∑
j=i+1
fjλ
i/(
j∑
l=0
λl)

 .
However, f may not be an explanation, since some fj may
be negative. This happens exactly when
d(i) <
K∑
j=i+1
fjλ
i/(
j∑
l=0
λl). (10)
As λ grows large, the right-hand side of (10) tends to 0. Since
d is fully-supported, we must have d(i) > 0. Thus, we can
ensure that (10) does not hold for any i by taking λ sufficiently
large. Thus, for sufficiently large λ, f provides an explanation
for d. Continuing to increase λ will give an infinite number of
different explanations.
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